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Moll: In Search of the Corporate Private Figure: Defamation of the Corp

NOTES
IN SEARCH OF THE CORPORATE PRIVATE FIGURE:
DEFAMATION OF THE CORPORATION
Corporations are considered persons for certain legal purposes.' Nevertheless, they are regarded as having no reputation in
the personal sense. 2 A corporation's interest in protecting its good
name, often referred to as its goodwill, 3 is solely economic. A corporation cannot experience pain and suffering, and it has no private
life to shield. 4 Thus, a defamation action brought by a corporation
may be maintained only for language which, as variously defined
by state law, casts aspersion on the corporation's honesty, credit,
efficiency, or other business character. 5
Under the United States Constitution, state law may not impose liability on the press for defamation without fault. 6 Thus,
1. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1816);
Aberdeen Bindery, Inc. v. Eastern States Printing & Publishing Co., 166 Misc. 904,
905, 3 N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1st Dep't 1938). W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7 (rev. perm. ed. 1974 & Supp.

1976).
2. Golden Palace, Inc. v. NBC, 386 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 1974); Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 571, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1963);
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 745 & n.10 (4th ed. 1971).
3. A corporation's goodwill is commonly equated with its reputation. More accurately, goodwill is a property right, an element of value, such as an advantage or a
benefit that is the consequence of, inter alia, a reputation for skill, affluence, or punctuality. Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893); Piggly
Wiggly Corp. v. Saunders, 1 F.2d 572, 580 (W.D. Tenn. 1924).
4. Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W. Va.
1968); Oasis Nite Club, Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 173 (D.C. Md. 1966); W.
FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 4255, at 73 (rev. perm. ed. 1976).
5. W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 745 & nn.11-13. E.g., New York law provides
"[that a corporation may maintain an action for libel where the publication assails
its management, credit or business, or holds it up to ridicule, contempt or disgrace."
Hornell Broadcasting Corp. v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 60, 63. 185 N.Y.S.2d
945, 949 (4th Dep't 1959), aff'd and appeal dismissed on other grounds, 8 N.Y.2d
767, 168 N.E.2d 115, 201 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1960) (two cases were consolidated). See
generally W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 4255, at 75 nn.10 & 11, 76 n.12 (rev. perm.
ed. 1976).
6. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). The communications
media, which include broadcasters as well as publishers, are referred to herein as
"the press." Prior to the Court's decision in Gertz, state libel law often provided
recovery for libel per se, that is, strict liability for publication of any untruthful
statement, regardless of the goodwill or reasonable care of the publisher, or the damage to the plaintiff. Id. at 346. The Court reasoned in Gertz that strict liability, to-
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courts afford recovery for injury to reputation (or goodwill) not
merely because a false defamatory statement was published, but
because it was published without requisite care. The Supreme
Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,7 set out the plaintiff's burden, and discussed this issue with regard to natural persons, not
corporations.
The burden for an individual to prove lack of requisite care in
a defamation action is prescribed by the holding in Gertz with reference to a constitutionally mandated privilege for the press. 8 This
privilege protects the press from defamation actions based on negligence which are brought by certain plaintiffs. 9 Gertz employed a
' status-based
analysis, distinguishing between plaintiffs who are
" public figures" and those who are "private figures."' 10 Gertz designated plaintiffs who have "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood"" as public figures; these plaintiffs are required to prove "actual malice.' 1 2 On
the other hand, where plaintiff is a private figure,' 3 recovery is
based upon-a less demanding burden, usually negligence. 14
Until 'r6v.ntly, cases applying the Gertz status-based standard
to corporate plaintiffs have done so without distingoishing between
gether with the doctrine of presumed damages, invited juries to punish unpopular
opinion, thereby inhib.iting the vigorous exercise of first amendment freedoms. Id. at
346, 349. Accordingly, -strict liability for defamation by the press was constitutionally
proscribed, and a minimum requirement of fault, that is, negligence, was established.
Id. at 347-49. The type of damages that may be recovered under state law is restricted by Gertz, which provides: "States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity
." Id. at 349. "It is necessary to restrict -defamation plaintiffs who do not prove
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual
injury." Id. When a corporation sues to recover damages for actual injury to its reputation, the term "special damages" refers to pecuniary loss directly resulting from
the defendant's defamatory statement. Erick- Bo% man Remedy Co., Inc. v. Jensen
Salsbery Laboratories, Inc., 17 F.2d 255, 260-61 (8th Cir. 1926). State law governs
the specificity with which special damages must be alleged. See, e.g., id. at 257; Golden Palace, Inc. v. NBC, 386 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1974).
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. See text accompanying notes 26-39 infra. t
9. Constitutional protection is afforded uthe press for suits brought by "[tlhose
who . . . are properly classed as public figuieg and those who hold governmental
office." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
10. See id. at 342-48.
11. Id. at 345.
12. Id. at 342-43. Actual malice exists when a statementi"I ,made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth,. N 'w-"York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). See text accompanyinglnokes 34-36 infra.
13. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-45 (1974).
14. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss2/3

2

Moll:DEFAMATION
In Search of the
Private Figure: Defamation of the Corp
THE CORPORATION
OF Corporate

19781

natural persons and corporations. 15 Two recent decisions 16 have
recognized this difference, but have reached conflicting results regarding its significance. A third decision 17 chose between the two
methods of analysis.
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co. ,18
the District Court for the District of Columbia held that Gertz applies only to natural persons and that the burden for corporations
is to be determined solely by the nature of the subject matter in
controversy. 19 Martin Marietta required all corporations, regardless of their nature or activities, to prove actual malice when the
defendant's publication concerned a matter of public or general
interest.
Six months later, in Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated
Press,20 the District Court for the Northern District of California
rejected the issue-based analysis of Martin Marietta.2 1 Trans World
Accounts held that the public-figure/private-figure analysis of Gertz
is appropriate for corporations as well as for individuals since "for
purposes of applying [the constitutionally mandated privilege] to
defamation claims, the distinction between corporations and individuals is one without a difference." 2 2 This holding determined a
corporation's burden by focusing exclusively on the Gertz statusbased analysis.
In September 1977, the District Court for the Southern District of New York followed Trans World Accounts. In Reliance
Insurance Co. v. Barron's,2 3 the court decided, without further
elaboration, that the status-based standard of Gertz "appeared pref-

erable. "24
As a result of these decisions, courts facing this issue will have
.F.2d 830 (8th Cir.
15. See, e.g., Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc4 ,06.'
1974); El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 389 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.NY: 1974), aff'd, 521
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975).
16. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947
(D.D.C. 1976).
17. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,
1977).
18. 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
19. See id. at 955-56. The court followed the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See text accompanying notes 40-44 infra.
20. 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
21. See id. at 819.
22. Id.
23. No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
24. Id., slip op. at 11.
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to choose between these conflicting methods of analysis or formulate a new rule. The issue-based standard of Martin Marietta,
which would treat all corporations alike, is supported by the first

amendment 25 and favors the public's interest in receiving full information. The status-based standard of Trans World Accounts and
Reliance designates corporations as public or private figures on the
basis of their actions. This approach distinguishes among corporations on equitable grounds in an attempt to reconcile first amendment interests and traditional common law tort concepts embodied
in state law. This note analyzes the three decisions and examines an
alternative rule to indicate that first amendment considerations
provide the preferable approach to the applicable burden for a corporate plaintiff in a defamation action.
EVOLUTION OF THE

Gertz-Firestone STANDARD

REGARDING

DEFAMATION OF NATURAL PERSONS

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,26 the United States Supreme
Court sought to reconcile a constitutionally protected area for the
press with traditional tort law concepts regarding defamation. This
protection was first established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 7 which held that the first amendment provides the press with
a qualified privilege against libel actions brought by public officials
for criticism of official conduct. 28 The Court in Gertz established
this privilege in recognition that the governed should be able to
criticize their governors 29 and that "debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust. . . , wide-open," 30 and free of unnecessary
self-censorship by the press. Since publishers could not predict
what a particular state jury would find to be negligently published,
and because liability was often imposed without fault,3 1 the threat
of liability could result in an inhibited and self-censored press. As
Justice Powell stated in a later decision: "Allowing the media to
avoid liability only by proving the truth of all injurious statements
does not accord adequate protection to First Amendment liberU.S. CONST. amend. I. See text accompanying notes 27-34 infra.
26. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
27. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28. See id. at 283.
29. Id. at 272.
30. Id. at 270.
31. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the common law
of Alabama which imposed strict liability for defamatory statements concerning public officials was held to violate the United States Constitution.
25.
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ties."3 2 To provide the press with necessary "breathing space, ' 3 3
the Court ruled that a newspaper could not be held liable for a
false story about the official conduct of a public official unless the
plaintiff could prove with convincing clarity that publication was
34
made with "actual malice."
Actual malice, the standard for culpable behavior or, alternatively, the plaintiff's burden, became a term of art. Actual malice is
present when a statement is made with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of the truth.3 5 The Supreme Court later
defined reckless disregard of the truth as publication with actual
36
and serious doubts concerning the story's accuracy.
A similarly demanding burden was extended to libel suits
brought by public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,3 7 and
its companion case, Associated Press v. Walker,3 8 thus further expanding the area of press protection. In Butts and Walker the
Court found both plaintiffs to be public figures because they
"commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient
access to the means of counterargument to be able 'to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory

statements. "9
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,40 the plurality opinion
abandoned a status-based determination of liability. Justice Brennan's plurality decision extended New York Times protection for
free and robust debate of public issues to publications concerning
matters of general or public interest, regardless of the plaintiff's
status.41 Extending the rationale of New York Times, Justice Brennan stated: "The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, ef32. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); accord, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
33. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
34. Id. at 279-80.
35. Id. at 280.
36. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
37. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court held that recovery would be permitted upon
"a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from
the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers." See id. at 155. Later cases interpret this standard as within the term of
art, "actual malice," without comment. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 336-37 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971).
38. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
39. Id. at 155 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring)).
40. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
41. See id. at 52.
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feet, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior
anonymity or notoriety." 2 Five opinions were written by the eight
participating Justices in RosenbIoom, none commanding more than
three votes. 43 Read together, these Rosenbloom opinions illustrate
the prevailing tension between conflicting values in the prior cases:
a democracy's rleed for full and uninhibited debate of important
public issues versus traditional tort law concepts which permit the
individual to recover when harmed by the acts of another.
Recognizing the uneasy coexistence of these values, the Court
in Gertz rejected the issue-based privilege of Rosenbloom because
it extended New York Times protection to suits brought by private
individuals. The Court concluded "that the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires
that a different rule should obtain with respect to them." 4 4 By
limiting the New York Times privilege to public officials and public
figures, Gertz preserved the individual's right to protect his private
45
life and good name from negligent defamation.
The distinction between public and private figures drawn by
the Court in Gertz was based on the conclusion that public figures
voluntarily expose themselves to increased risk of injury and have
greater access to the media for purposes of rebuttal. 46 Therefore,
New York Times malice is the appropriate standard. In contrast,
the private figure, who has not relinquished his interest in the protection of his own good name, has "a more compelling call on the
courts," 47 thus justifying the less demanding negligence standard.
The Court in Gertz established a third status classification, the
limited public figure:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and
in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects

42. Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
43. It is generally overlooked that plaintiff Rosenbloom was doing business as a
partnership which distributed literature alleged to be obscene. Id. at 34 n.7. Only
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion reflected this business aspect of plaintiff's role
in the suit and addressed the public's interest in corporate activities. See id. at 42;
note 114 infra.
44. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974). The Court also based
its rejection of issue-based analysis on the difficulties presented by judicial ad hoc
determinations of what constitutes a public issue. See id. at 343-44.
45. See id. at 341.
46. Id. at 344-45.
47. Id. at 345.
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himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and
48
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.
Although Gertz established a two-tiered test to distinguish between public and private figures, that is, voluntary exposure to increased risk of defamation (consent) and access to the media for
purposes of rebuttal (self-protection), the limited public figure is
not subject to these same criteria. Thus, an individual who would
be a private figure under the dual criteria of consent and selfprotection may nonetheless be required to meet the actual malice
standard as a limited public figure because he has been drawn into
a particular public controversy.
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,4 9 application of the Gertz formula
resulted in denial of New York Times protection to a defamatory
publication which had incorrectly reported details of a wealthy
socialite's divorce proceedings. The Court held that plaintiff Firestone had not voluntarily shed the protection afforded by her private figure status. Lapsing into issue-based analysis, the Court held
that plaintiff's personal divorce action was not a subject of general
interest. 50 Thus, although Gertz imposed "a variable standard of
fault by exclusive focus on the public or private character of the
plaintiff,"5' Firestone implied that Rosenbloom's issue-based anal52
ysis might be relevant as well.
DEFAMATION OF THE CORPORATION

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co. 5 3 was
the first decision to offer a thoughtful analysis of the corporation's
place in contemporary case law regarding defamation. 54 This case
48. Id. at 351.
49. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
50. See id. at 454.
51. Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1205, 1206 (1976).
52. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 487-88 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53. 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).

54. Courts applying the Gertz formula to corporate plaintiffs have found the
applicable standard for liability to be negligence, see Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGrawHill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1974); El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 389 F.
Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975), as well as actual
malice, see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,

1977); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal.
1977); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947
(D.D.C. 1976). The plaintiff in Drotzmanns, a trucking corporation, won a jury ver-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[6: 339

involved one in a series of articles on the attempts by defense contractors to secure government contracts. The article reported that
the corporate plaintiff had hosted a stag party for an Air Force
official at its privately leased hunting lodge, that one-third of the
forty to fifty guests were Defense Department personnel, and that
two prostitutes had been hired for the weekend. The defense contractor brought suit for compensatory and punitive damages, and
for injunctive relief requiring a retraction. District Judge Flannery
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding
that the issue-based standard of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,55
applies to a corporation which, by its nature, does not possess the
personal interests protected by Gertz. 56 Martin Marietta rejected
the rationale of Gertz:
It is quite clear from the Court's opinion [in Gertz], however,
that the values considered important enough to merit accommodation with interests protected by the first amendment are associated solely with natural persons, and that corporations, while
legal persons for some purposes, possess none of the attributes
the Court sought to protect. Justice Powell's detailed explanation
of the personal values deserving deference from the first amendment leaves no doubt that corporations must be excluded from
the Gertz holding. 57
The court in Martin Marietta also noted that although the Gertz
public figure standards were designed to ascertain whether a person has lost claim to his private life, the corporation, regardless of
58
its activities, never had a private life to lose.
Martin Marietta held that the Rosenbloom issue-based standard is appropriate for corporations not only because of their lack
dict based upon instructions regarding the malice standard given just prior to the
Supreme Court's holding in Gertz. On appeal, the court merely noted that both parties had acknowledged the applicability of Gertz. See Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGrawHill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1974). A negligence standard was then adopted
by the court without any further comment. In El Meson Espanol the court reluctantly applied the Gertz formula. This reluctance was not related to the corporate
character of the plaintiff, which was not discussed, but rather to the lack of recognition afforded under the Gertz formula to the publication's subject matter, illegal distribution of cocaine in the metropolitan area. This decision was affirmed because
there had been no defamation. See El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 521 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1975).
55. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
56. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947, 954-56 (D.D.C. 1976).
57. Id. at 955.
58. See id.
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of private interests, but also because the Rosenbloom rule requires
the actual malice standard only when issues of legitimate public
concern are discussed. 59 Mere incorporation does not automatically
impose the higher burden in all situations. Accordingly, the court
found that the publication at issue concerned matters of legitimate
public interest and that the actual malice standard applied.
Judge Flannery provided an alternative rationale for imposing
the actual malice standard in this case. Noting that higher courts
might attempt to fit corporate plaintiffs into the ill-fitting mold of
the Gertz formula,6 0 he concluded that even under that unsatisfactory mode of analysis, Martin Marietta Corporation was a public
figure for the purpose of affording New York Times protection to
the press. 6 1 Accordingly, Judge Flannery reshaped the Gertz
status-based formula as expanded by Time, Inc. v. Firestone,62 applying it to corporate plaintiffs. Under this alternative rationale, the
actual malice burden is imposed only upon a finding that the corthat the alleged defamatory stateporation is a public figure and
63
ment involved a public issue.
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press,64 decided
after Martin Marietta, held that the corporate plaintiff in that action had to prove New York Times malice, but reached that result
by applying the status-based formula of Gertz. 65 Trans World Accounts, Inc., a debt collection agency, charged the defendant with
incorrectly reporting a Federal Trade Commission release which
named the plaintiff, along with others, as subject to several Commission enforcement efforts. The defendant represented plaintiff
as subject to all, rather than some, enforcement efforts. Judge
Schwarzer rejected the holding of Martin Marietta, stating that
where small single proprietorships as well as large business enterprises may be corporations, "the line between the interests of
natural persons and corporations is frequently fuzzy and ill-defined.
IF]or purposes of applying the First Amendment to defamation
[..
59. See id. at 956.
60. No higher court has decided whether the standards set forth in Gertz for
determining whether a libel plaintiff is a public figure must be applied to a corporation.
61. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947, 956 (D.D.C. 1976).
62. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See text accompanying notes 51 & 52 supra.
63. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947, 956-57 (D.D.C. 1976).
64. 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
65. See id. at 819-21.
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claims, the distinction between corporations and individuals is one
without a difference." 6 6 Judge Schwarzer held, therefore, that the
Gertz status-based analysis was appropriate.
The court in Trans World Accounts stated that although the
plaintiff neither had achieved pervasive fame or notoriety nor had
voluntarily injected itself into a particular public controversy, it was
nonetheless a public figure under Gertz and Firestone because
"participants in some litigation may be legitimate 'public figures,'
either generally or for the limited purpose of that litigation." 6 7 The
court then found plaintiff to be a limited public figure, explaining:
Trans World may not have been a "public figure" until the
proposed complaint issued but when it did it was clearly drawn
into a particular controversy having its origin in Trans World's
own conduct and activities and thereby became a public figure
for the limited range of issues relating to the FTC's complaint.
The defendants' publication, derived from the press release issued by the FTC as a part of its enforcement effort, reported on
alleged practices of Trans World which the FTC considered to
create a sufficient risk of harm to the public to warrant issuance
68
of a complaint and public notice.
The court reasoned that plaintiff's voluntary practices and activities
were in an area subject to governmental regulation, and because
plaintiff had been named in the public notice of a proposed complaint, plaintiff had been drawn into a public controversy.6 9
Trans World Accounts holds that New York Times protection
will be extended to the press in suits based on false and defamatory
statements concerning regulated activity. By focusing on governmental regulation and publicity, the court established a principle that may confer limited public figure status on a wide range of
business plaintiffs, including single proprietors and partnerships.
The rule established in Martin Marietta is narrower because it
applies issue-based analysis only to corporations.
Since Trans World Accounts, Inc., "may not have been a public figure until the proposed complaint issued," 70 the basis of plaintiff's public figure status was solely the government's decision to
publicize its role as a participant in a specific enforcement proceed66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 819.
Id. at 820 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976)).
Id. at 821 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 820.
Id. at 821.
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ing. 7 1 Thus, the nature of the litigation conferred public figure
status and the court, sub silentio, applied Rosenbloon's issue-based
72 Alanalysis under the guise of Gertz's status-based language.
though Trans World Accounts held that the Gertz status-based
analysis should determine the appropriate standard of care for corporations, this decision did not apply the Gertz dual criteria of consent and self-protection to determine plaintiffs status. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's,73 on the other hand, applied the Gertz
criteria to the corporate plaintiff.
In Reliance defendant, a well-known financial magazine, published an article criticizing plaintiff's preliminary prospectus, a
document that had provided information to the public in connection with a proposed offering of preferred stock. The article
charged that the plaintiff had employed "creative accounting" 74
concepts, that the plaintiff had engaged in improper business practices, and that the proceeds of the proposed sale would flow upof
stream from plaintiff to its parent corporation to the detriment
75
plaintiff, its policyholders, and its minority shareholders.
The district court held that the article was "clearly defamatory"76 and concluded without discussion that it was preferable to
"follow Trans World Accounts, and consider whether [plaintiff] is" 7a7
public figure in accordance with the terms set forth in Gertz.
Judge Brieant found plaintiff in Reliance to be "a public figure with
respect to issues involving its offering of securities to the public"78
because it had voluntarily thrust itself into a public controversy by
offering a new issue of stock and by filing a registration statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 79 The court also
found plaintiff to be "a public figure in the general sense"8 0 based
71. The court noted: "An integral feature of the Commission's enforcement effort is the publicity which attends the issuance of proposed complaints." Id.
72. Similarly, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the plaintiff's
status was determined by an inquiry into the term "public controversy" despite the
Court's specific rejection of issue-based analysis in Gertz. Id. at 487 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 635, 646 (1977).
73. No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
74. Id., slip op. at 4.
75. Id. Plaintiff's common stock was 96.9% owned by Reliance Financial Services Corp., the common stock of which was wholly owned by Reliance Group, Inc.
Id. at 2.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11-12.
See id. at 11-12 & n.1.
Id. at 12.
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on its role in society. 8 ' The district court noted that plaintiff was a
large publicly held corporation whose shares were traded on the
New York Stock Exchange, that plaintiff was a member of the
closely regulated insurance industry, and that there was considerable public interest in plaintiff because of its parent corporation's
prior financial activities.82 The designation of Reliance Insurance
Co. as a public figure thus rested on both the public interest considerations of Rosenbloom and the notoriety and voluntary activity
required by Gertz.
THE CORPORATE PRIVATE FIGURE AND
PROTECTION FROM NEGLIGENT DEFAMATION

While in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper
Co.,8 Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press,84 and Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's85 each corporate plaintiff was required to prove actual malice, the reasoning behind the result differed from case to case. Martin Marietta's use of the Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc. ,86 standard imposes the actual malice burden only
in connection with an issue of public or general interest. Absent
such issue, the applicable burden is negligence.87 Trans World
Accounts and Reliance, by using the public-figure/private-figure
analysis of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,8 imply the general existence of corporate private figures for whom the negligence standard
would always be appropriate, even in the context of a public issue.
These later cases also imply that the criteria established by Gertz
to distinguish between public and private individuals are equally
useful in identifying corporate private figures.
Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,89 and El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp. 90 imposed the negligence standard on corporations and thus, by definition, were concerned with the claims of
corporate private figures. 91 However, these decisions did not offer
81. See id.
82. See id. at 11-12. See generally Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
83.
84.

417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).

85. No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
86. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
87. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947,
956 (D.D.C. 1976).
88. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
89. 500 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1974).
90. 389 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975).
91. Plaintiff bar and grill in El Meson Espanol was found to be a private figure,
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any justification for equating the corporations' interest in their
reputations with that of the purely private person. These decisions
did not examine the nature of the corporate reputation generally,
the public's interest in corporate activity, or the appropriate balance between the two. Only by comparing the Gertz accommodation of reputation interests and first amendment interests regarding
individuals with the appropriate accommodation of those interests
regarding corporations can one determine whether the corporation
should be subject to the Gertz status-based analysis.
Protection of the CorporateReputation
The corporate reputation is devoid of personal qualities. But it
was precisely these personal values that the Supreme Court sought
to protect by the private figure designation in Gertz:92
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is
the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them
by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State
to abandon this purpose, for, as MR. JUSTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right to the protection of his own
good name
"reflects no more than our basic concept of essential
dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The
protection of private personality, like the protection of
life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not
mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition
by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system." 93
The court in Martin Marietta reasoned that since the corporation's interest in its reputation lacks the personal element described in Gertz, the resulting nonpersonal interest would be insufficient to justify protection from negligence when there is an issue

see El Meson Espanol v. NYM Corp., 389 F. Supp. 357, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd,

521 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975). In Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830
(8th Cir. 1974), the court applied a negligence standard without discussing plaintiff's
status. See id. at 833. However, since the rule in Gertz required the burden to be
determined by plaintiff's status, the court sub silentio found plaintiff, a trucking corporation, to be a private figure.
92. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-43 (1974).
93. Id. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added).
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of public interest.9 4 This court stated that the law of libel traditionally distinguished between corporate and natural person plaintiffs
in that a corporation "has no personal reputation"95 and that the

District of Columbia affords limited recovery to corporations as
compared with individuals. 96 The court relied upon these established doctrines in concluding that "a corporate libel action is not 'a
basic of our constitutional system,' and need not force the first
amendment to yield as far as it would . . . in a private libel ac97
tion."
Although the court reasoned that Gertz offered no justification
for protecting the corporation from the negligence of the press, 98 it
noted that the alternative public figure designation would impose
the actual malice burden on corporate plaintiffs in all situations. 99
Accordingly, the court held that the issue-based analysis of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 10 0 is appropriate for corporations.101

Thus, Martin Marietta rejected private figure analysis as a means of
protecting the corporate reputation from negligent defamation.
Martin Marietta adopted an issue-based analysis which offers such
protection from negligence when the subject matter of the defamatory material is not an issue of public interest.
Trans World Accounts found that the corporation is analogous
to the private figure of Gertz, implying that although the nonpersonal corporate reputation may be different from, or even less than
94. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947, 955 (D.D.C. 1976).
95. Id. (emphasis in original).

96. See id.
97. Id. This conclusion was also based upon the Supreme Court's holding in
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), which indicated that "the type of private controversies the Court sought to protect in Gertz were those of a highly personal nature, and not the type which could be associated with corporate activity."
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D.D.C.
1976).
98. Martin Marietta held, in effect, that the protection which is afforded by
private figure status is limited to human beings. In dicta, the court narrowed the
scope of this protection to personal events in their lives. This refinement of the private figure status established in Gertz is consistent with the definition of the term
"private figure" that has been provided by Justice Harlan: "simply a private citizen,
a purely private individual," see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 65-72
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); and Justice Marshall: "an anonymous person, an
obscure private life," see id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947, 956 (D.D.C. 1976).
100. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
101. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947, 956 (D.D.C. 1976).
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the individual's personal reputation, it is nonetheless entitled to
protection from negligence. 10 2 The court based its conclusion on
the ability of the corporation to recover damages as would an individual under California law. 10 3 However, Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v.
AFL-CIO,'10 4 the authority relied on for this proposition, was decided prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 10 5 and thus failed

to consider the differences between corporations and individuals
regarding the first amendment privilege established by that decision.
Neither Trans World Accounts, Reliance, nor the alternative

rationale offered by Martin Marietta defined the corporate interest
to be protected from negligent defamation by private figure status,
although all the decisions recognized that this interest differs from
an individual's privacy interest.106 Moreover, none of these decisions recognized the compelling first amendment considerations
concerning all corporations, but which do not apply to private
natural persons, and were not, therefore, considered in Gertz.
In Trans World Accounts the court rejected Martin Marietta's

subject matter approach which was based on the public's general
interest in corporate activities. Judge Schwarzer indicated that the
Supreme Court in Gertz had rejected Rosenbloom's issue-based
analysis without qualification. 10 7 For this reason, Judge Schwarzer
refused to be bound by United Medical Laboratories v. CBS,
Inc. ,108 a post-New York Times decision by the Ninth Circuit. That

decision held that public interest in the plaintiff corporation's mailorder medical laboratory business justified the imposition of the
102. See Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
103. See id.
104. 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 570-72, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-56 (1963), cited in
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal.

1977).
105. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB, slip op. at 10
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977); Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F.
Supp. 814, 819 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper
Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D.D.C. 1976).
107. See Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819
(N.D. Cal. 1977). But cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 488 (1976) (Marshall,

J., dissenting) (although Gertz explicitly rejected issue-based analysis of plurality
opinion in Rosenbloom, Court's opinion in Firestone reintroduced such analysis by
its inquiry into term "public controversy").
108. 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969), cited in
Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 819 n.1 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
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actual malice burden, even though the corporation was neither a
public official nor a public figure as defined in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts'0 9 and Associated Press v. Walker."10 Nevertheless,
the decision in Trans World Accounts turned, ironically, on public
interest considerations. The court emphasized the protective function of the government's policy of publicizing certain enforcement
measures and held plaintiff to be a limited public figure because of
the public's interest in the pending litigation."' Similarly, the public figure designations in Martin Marietta1 2 and Reliance1 13 were
based on the special public interest in corporate affairs.
The entry of a private person into the business world through
the act of incorporation gives rise to the public's legitimate interest
in corporate activities. The corporation is a creature of the state. It
is subject to state and federal regulation which are sensitive to the
political process. The public, therefore, has a legitimate interest in
corporate activities. The corporation exists both in the political
world, 14 in which cases arise dealing with defamation of natural
109. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See text accompanying note 39 supra.
110. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
111. See Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814,
820-21 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
112. In Martin Marietta the court held plaintiff to be a limited public figure for
the range of issues discussed in defendant's article on the ground that, inter alla,
"the public has an interest in the manner by which defense contracts are awarded."
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 957
(D.D.C. 1976).
113. In Reliance the court held plaintiff to be a public figure in the general
sense because of its role in society as well as a limited public figure with respect to
its offering of securities. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB, slip
op. at 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
114. The plurality decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29
(1971), recognized that:
[i]ncreasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred.... In many situations, policy determinations which
traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are now
originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees,
commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected
with the Government....
...Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of
such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate
about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in
the case of "public officials."
Id. at 41-42 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967)
(Warren, C.J., concurring)) (emphasis added). Contemporary political issues of general public interest which involve corporations are, for example, intervention in
foreign politics by American multinational corporations, political contributions, lobbying efforts, and discriminatory hiring or business practices.
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persons, for example, civil rights i i5 and Communist affiliation,' 1 6
and in the financial world.
In the financial context, the corporation is arguably analogous
to the public official of New York Times for purposes of stockholder
suffrage or the decisions to be made by potential investors, lenders, or consumers. Just as shareholders cast votes for corporate officers, the public casts economic votes by choosing among competing goods, services, and financial opportunities. For this reason,
the court in Reliance, which concerned a corporate plaintiff's offering of preferred stock, stated that "the public interest is well
served by encouraging the free press to investigate and comment
on business and corporate affairs in the same manner as it would
i 7
report on other public issues.""
As indicated in Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated
Press"i 8 and in Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's,"19 disclosure of
information to alert the public to potential harm or merely to provide full information is an integral part of the government's regulatory policy. 12 0 Publication of consumer information serves to
educate generally as well as to identify those who abuse the public's trust. This is true for all corporations, even the closely held
mom and pop" businesses, albeit the size of the interested public
will be smaller. For example, the public is as concerned with the
practices of a small check-cashing business operating in a storefront
as it is with those of a major credit institution.'12 Designating a
small vocational school, a restaurant, or a home improvement firm
as a corporate private figure exposes the press to liability for negli115. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
116. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

117.
(S.D.N.Y.
118.
119.
120.

Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB, slip op. at 14
Sept. 14, 1977).
425 F. Supp. 814, 820-21 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB, slip op. at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
Trans World Accounts extends New York Times protection to statements

concerning regulated activity. See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra. Reliance
suggests that the privilege should apply to statements concerning corporate activities
that are not presently regulated but which present substantial questions of potential regulation. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB, slip op. at 14
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
121. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), where the defamatory statement concerned distribution of allegedly obscene magazines, the plurality opinion stated: "Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale magazine
distributor or a 'private' businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance
in ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the issue." Id. at 43.
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gence. The threat of liability, imposed by unpredictable juries, can
only result in the self-censorship by the press that New York Times
sought to avoid when important public issues are involved.
Legitimate public scrutiny of the corporation, therefore, precludes protection of the corporate reputation by analogy to the private life of a natural person. A better explanation for why such
analogy is used in Trans World Accounts and Reliance may be
found in the courts' reluctance to apply generally the demanding
actual malice burden to future corporate plaintiffs who may be as
defenseless as the private individuals protected by Gertz. The level
of "clear and convincing proof required . . . to show 'actual malice'
in a defamation case"'122 was characterized by the court in Reliance
as "almost insuperable.' 2 3 These decisions, therefore, did not
identify a corporate interest to be protected from negligence, but
turned on considerations of fairness in distinguishing among corporations.
Identifying the CorporatePrivate Figure
Gertz stated that private figures are both more vulnerable to
harm from defamation, because, they are unable to contradict or correct the defamatory statement, and are more deserving of protec24
tion because they have not consented to greater public scrutiny.'
Accordingly, the Court established two general standards to distinguish among defamation plaintiffs: plaintiff's "access to the channels
of effective communication" for the purpose of rebuttal, 1 25 and
plaintiff's voluntary exposure to "increased risk of injury from de126
famatory falsehood."'
A requirement that the corporation have access to the media
for rebuttal is rooted in tort law's focus on a plaintiff's ability to
protect itself.127 That requirement is also essential for the democratic debate of ideas envisioned in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.1 28 Here, tort and first amendment interests meet in providing
an apparently useful standard for distinguishing among corporate
plaintiffs. However, a rule that would distinguish among corporate
plaintiffs on the basis of their access to the media as perceived by
122.

Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB, slip op. at 1-2

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
123. Id. at 2.

124. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
125. Id. at 344.
126.

Id. at 345.

127. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967).
128.

376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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the press at the time of publication provides neither simplicity of
application nor certainty of result. More importantly, such a rule is
entirely insensitive to variations in the public's need for information based on the particular issue or industry involved. In Reliance
the court held that although the corporate plaintiffs ability to rebut
was greatly inhibited by government regulations, it was nonetheless a public figure because of its voluntary activities.' 29 Thus a
corporation's lack of access to the media would not determine the
appropriate burden when the corporation has satisfied the voluntary activity requirement of Gertz. 130

But a focus solely on voluntary and visible corporate activities
does not identify vulnerable corporations. A corporation's entry

into the marketplace is a voluntary act that invites customers as
well as greater public scrutiny and comment.' 3 ' All corporations
are thereby distinguished from purely private persons. Moreover, a

requirement of visible voluntary activity is irrelevant where secret
or unknown corporate activities may be a proper subject for public

information in, for example, price-fixing agreements and illegal
payments. For this reason, the court in Reliance encouraged the

press to investigate as well as to comment on business and corpo32
rate affairs.'
Although Gertz suggested that status should be determined by
the nature and extent of plaintiff's actions, 133 neither a corporation's size nor the manner in which its stock is held provides an

accurate and consistent standard for identifying corporate private
plaintiffs.'

34

129. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB, slip op. at 12-13
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
130. Justice Brennan argued that the ability to respond through the media
"seems too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a constitutional distinction."
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971) (plurality opinion), quoted
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 363-64 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Under the alternative rationale in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976), the plaintiff corporation's decision
to compete for defense contracts was found to be a requisite voluntary act and
thereby conferred public figure status. See id. at 957.
132. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB, slip op. at 14-15
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977). The court stated: "Investigative reporting is not limited to
the impeachment of presidents or the exposure of licentious congressmen. The public interest is served equally when reporters find a 'Deep Throat' in the executive
suite .... "Id. at 14 (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 205
(S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
133. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
134. It has been suggested that questions involving corporations which have
most of their outstanding shares in the hands of the public should be resolved by

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[6: 339

Gertz also provided that even where the two general standards, consent and self-protection, have not been met, a corporation may still be required to prove actual malice if it is found to be
a limited public figure. 135 As illustrated in Trans World Accounts,
this limited status designation turns on public interest considerations.' 3 6 Thus, under Gertz, it is the public's legitimate interest
that will ultimately determine the appropriate burden, rather than
plaintiff's activities, size, or vulnerability.
Since it is inevitable that the burden to be imposed on a corporation will be based on public interest considerations, it is preferable to reach that issue-based result through the issue-based
analysis of Rosenbloom rather than the status-based approach required by Gertz. For even under Gertz, when the public has a
legitimate interest in full information concerning a corporation's activities, the courts will protect that interest by providing the press
with appropriate first amendment protection; 137 this will preclude
the finding of corporate private figures.
CONCLUSION

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 138 established a balance between
the state's interest in protecting the reputations of private individuals and the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. The
state interest in affording recovery for injury to a corporation's
reputation is, however, less compelling than in the case of a natural
person's reputation. The public's legitimate need for information
concerning corporate activities exceeds its interest in private individuals. Thus, the balance established by Gertz, which permitted a
lower burden for private natural persons, is insufficiently sensitive
to first amendment considerations when applied to corporate plaintiffs. A better balance would favor the flow of information to the
consideration of relevant issues of public or general concern. See Hill, supra note 51,
at 1217. However, this standard would not support judicial consideration of the public interest in Reliance. In that case, 96.9% of plaintiff's common stock was owned by
a second corporation which was entirely owned by a third. Nonetheless, Judge
Brieant held that plaintiff was a public figure generally because of the public's interest in plaintiff and its role in society.
135. "[A]n individual . . . drawn into a particular public controversy . . .
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). See text accompanying note 48 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
137. See Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
138. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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public when an issue of general interest is involved. The issuebased rule in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,13 9 protects the press
by imposing the more demanding actual malice burden on plaintiff
only when there is an issue of general interest, and only with respect to that issue. Martin Marietta v. Evening Star Newspaper
Co. ,140 therefore, applied the Rosenbloom standard.
Application of Gertz to corporate plaintiffs in Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press14 1 and Reliance Insurance Co. v.
Barron's 42 can be explained by the courts' reluctance to impose
the almost insurmountable actual malice burden on future vulnerable plaintiffs solely because of the act of incorporation. However,
the traditional tort law analysis required by Gertz to confer public
figure or private figure status fails to identify vulnerable corporations.
Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 14 the law of defamation has provided two methods of analysis. Under first amendment
analysis as presented in Rosenbloom, the constitutional privilege
established by New York Times is an absolute bar to press liability
for negligence when the alleged defamation concerns matters
of legitimate public interest. By contrast, under traditional tort
analysis, 144 plaintiff's voluntary activities which knowingly increase
the risk of defamation, and plaintiff's ability to contradict the defamatory statement justify denying recovery to public officials and
public figures for negligent injury to reputation. Thus, for the
Gertz private figure who neither has consented nor has the ability
to protect himself, tort law affords recovery for negligent injury
regardless of the nature of the defamatory subject matter.
However, when these unreconcilable methods of analysis are
applied to defamation of the corporation, the courts have found tort
law analysis inadequate, if not irrelevant. The cases discussed in
this note indicate that the corporation consents when it decides to
compete or to offer stock to the public. Thus, all corporations consent when entering the marketplace. These decisions also stand for
139.

403 U.S. 29 (1971).

140.

417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).

141.

425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).

142. No. 76 Civ. 4094-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1977).
143. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
144. For examples of traditional tort analysis, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 70-71 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967). Justice Harlan's use of tort analysis in Butts and in
Rosenbloom was reiterated by the majority in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 344-45 (1974).
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the proposition that a corporation's lack of ability to contradict the
defamatory statement is immaterial to its ability to recover for negligence. More importantly, each of these decisions found the corporate plaintiff to be a limited public figure, a designation devoid
of tort law requirements, being determined instead by first
amendment considerations, that is, the involvement of a public
controversy.
Since first amendment analysis is insensitive to plaintiff's vulnerability, continued recourse to limited public figure status will
permit courts to apply that designation to any corporate plaintiff
involved in a legitimate public controversy. Courts will, therefore,
reach the same result under Gertz or Rosenbloom, but only the
first amendment method of analysis is relevant and should be
applied to corporate defamation plaintiffs.
Nessa E. Moll
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